第55章 Chapter II(26)

His method in 'moral science'follows the lines now laid down.All inference,as he has urged,consists of 'inductions'and 'the interpretation of inductions.'(112)Deduction is the application to new cases of the laws observed in previous cases.

As our knowledge of such laws multiplies,science tends to become more deductive.But the deduction is still an induction;and the true antithesis is not between deductive and inductive but between 'deductive and experimental.'(113)Deductive reasoning,that is,simply applies a previous induction;but reasoning becomes 'experimental'when we have to interrogate nature for a fresh rule.This has an important bearing upon the next step.

Social phenomena of all kinds are so complex that we cannot apply his four methods.They belong to the region (in his phraseology)of the 'intermixture of laws'and 'plurality of causes';(114)and though the phrases be inaccurate,the example certainly illustrates their plausibility.Experimental reasoning is thus impossible.We have,therefore,to fall back upon the 'deductive'method,which,indeed,would lead to mere 'conjecture'were it not for the essential aid of Verification.(115)The meaning of this is explained in two chapters really directed against Macaulay and James Mill,and giving the theory which had been suggested by their controversy.(116)Macaulay used the 'chemical'method.If men in society formed a new product differing from the individual man,as water from oxygen and hydrogen,or,in Mill's phrase,if the social union afforded 'heteropathic'laws,we should have to study social science apart from the science of individual human nature.But as men even in society are still men,the social law is derivable from the laws of individual nature.It is a case of 'composition of causes.'

Now the purely empirical reasoner neglects this obvious fact.He reasons from immediate experience without connecting his conclusions with psychology.He argues offhand that because the English have flourished under the old parliamentary system,therefore the old parliamentary system was perfect.That gives the crude empiricism preached by Macaulay in the name of Bacon.

James Mill,on the contrary,represents the 'geometrical method.'

He argued about politics as if all constitutional questions could be settled like a geometrical problem by appeals to a single axiom.Therefore a doctrine applicable to the immediate question of parliamentary reform was put forward as a general theory of government.Mill tells us in the Autobiography(117)that his reflection upon this controversy led to a critical point of his doctrine.Science must be deductive,when the effects are simply the sum of those due to the operating causes;inductive,when they are not the sum,that is,when 'heteropathic'laws appear.

Hence,he inferred,politics must be treated deductively,though not as his father had done,geometrically.

Both the criticisms are much to the purpose.Here I need only remark one point which affects Mill's later conclusions.Was Mill's inference correct?Is it true that the social phenomena represent simply the sum of the individual actions?Undoubtedly,there is a good deal to be said for it.Society does not exist apart from the individuals of which it is constructed.Moreover,in a great many cases,if we know the average character of an individual,we can deduce the character of a number of individuals.The bulk of what is called knowledge of the world is made up from more or less shrewd conjectures as to the motives of the average man.If we know what the average man thinks,we can guess what will be the opinion of a majority of the House of Commons.There are,however,two points which are taken for granted.In the first place,if we are to deduce the social phenomena from the individual,we must know the individual,who is already a tolerably complex product.In Mill's language,we require an ethology.and the name already indicates a difficulty.

Can we consider the average man to be a constant?or must we not take into account the fact that he is also a product of society,and varies upon our hands as society develops?And beyond this there is the further question,whether,in so far as society can be properly regarded as an 'organism,'we can fully explain the laws of social combination by considering the laws of individual character.Are not the two sets of laws so intricately combined and blended that the analysis of a society into separate individuals becomes necessarily illusory?Can we explain the reciprocal actions and reactions of a social body by simply adding together the laws of individual conduct?These questions will meet us in considering Mill's practical application of his theories.They amount to asking whether 'sociology'can be constituted from a purely 'individualist'basis,and Mill's view of sociology is a vital point in his doctrine.The name had already been invented by Comte,and Mill at this time was greatly influenced by Comte,and especially was kindled to enthusiasm by the last two volumes of the Philosophie Positive,containing a connected view of history.Although Mill had,as he says,worked out his theory of induction before reading Comte,he owed a great deal,as he fully acknowledges,to Comte's philosophy.The two lines of thought,however,could never completely coalesce,and the result appears in this part of Mill's book.